Nearly two months after two natural gas-fueled explosions rocked San Antonio’s Preston Hollow neighborhood, city leaders convened a special council session Monday to review emergency response coordination and communication procedures in the aftermath of a neighborhood disaster.
The meeting was prompted by the April 21 explosions that destroyed two homes, seriously injured five residents and left a Northeast Side neighborhood searching for answers. However, the discussion centered less on what caused the blasts and more on how residents were informed and supported in the days and weeks that followed.
City officials said from the outset that they were limited in which specifics about the Preston Hollow blasts they could discuss because of an ongoing National Transportation Safety Board investigation and pending litigation filed by explosion victims against CPS Energy.
First Assistant City Attorney Elizabeth Provencio told council the briefing would be limited to the NTSB’s preliminary report, the city’s community response outside of fire and police emergency operations and general gas safety information.
Nonetheless, District 10 Councilman Marc Whyte, who authored the three-signature memo calling for the meeting, said residents in his district were still seeking answers about how information was shared following the explosions and who was responsible for coordinating communication among the multiple agencies involved.
“Preston Hollow deserves better. There are so many unanswered questions as we sit here today,” Whyte said. “What happened on April 21 was really a tragedy that has led to weeks and months of fear, uncertainty and disruption of daily life.”
Residents who spoke at the meeting said the explosions left them with a diminished sense of security in their homes and ongoing questions about gas infrastructure, odor complaints, cleanup and communication.
“Houses don’t blow up,” Tony Flores, speaking on behalf of the Preston Hollow Homeowners Association, told council. “We want transparency, accountability, communication, and a clear plan forward to restore confidence in our neighborhood, because every family in San Antonio deserves to feel safe in their own home.”
Who takes the lead?
Whyte said his office spent weeks fielding questions from residents about who was in charge, which agency was responsible for communicating with the neighborhood and why some residents reported receiving conflicting information about whether they could safely return to their homes.
In response, the city attorney’s office repeatedly intervened, saying those specifics were part of the NTSB investigation.
While officials could not discuss specific decisions made during the Preston Hollow response, they did speak about the city’s broader emergency management framework in an effort to explain how multi-agency incidents are typically handled.
Several of Whyte’s questions centered on whether the city should have activated additional emergency management resources and who would normally be responsible for coordinating information among agencies and residents during a neighborhood-level disaster.
San Antonio Fire Chief Valerie Frausto told the council the Emergency Operations Center — the centralized command structure used during large-scale disasters such as major floods, hurricanes or other incidents requiring extensive coordination across multiple departments and agencies — was not activated during the Preston Hollow incident.
Frausto said the Emergency Operations Center is generally activated when an incident threatens critical infrastructure, overwhelms routine response capabilities, requires significant resource coordination or is expected to continue across multiple operational periods.
Frausto said the Preston Hollow incident was instead managed through the Incident Command System, the framework emergency responders use to coordinate personnel, resources and decision-making at an active emergency scene. While the city did not activate its larger Emergency Operations Center, officials said firefighters, police officers, CPS Energy personnel and other agencies still operated under a structured command system during the response.
Deputy City Manager María Villagómez said the city’s lead department varies, depending on the emergency.
In some situations that may be the fire department, while others may be led by police, Public Works or another city department. The city’s emergency management plan outlines those responsibilities and how agencies coordinate during a response.
The discussion highlighted a distinction that became central to council members’ concerns: while the city has established systems for managing emergency operations, several members questioned how that information is communicated to residents during the emergency, then and after the immediate crisis has passed and recovery efforts begin.
District 3 Councilwoman Phyllis Viagran said the city should examine what role council offices should play in sharing information with residents after major incidents. District 1 Councilwoman Sukh Kaur said uncertainty often grows when information is limited.
“A lot of times when there is fear, the best thing that we can do is communicate what is happening. When there is a lack of communication, the fear intensifies,” Kaur said.
Mayor Gina Ortiz Jones also pointed to family members of explosion victims who struggled to locate relatives who had been transported to hospitals after the incident, saying the city should review how it shares information with impacted families.
Following the explosions, the city opened a reunification center at the Northeast Senior Center for residents seeking information and assistance.
CPS Energy said it remained engaged with affected families for nearly two weeks, helping arrange hotel and Airbnb accommodations, providing gift cards and connecting residents with other support services as recovery efforts continued.
City Manager Erik Walsh said the city will explore plans to incorporate a neighborhood-focused emergency scenario into the annual Emergency Operations Center training for elected officials and staff, including information on the role of council offices and wraparound support for affected families.
“I do like the idea and it’s certainly pertinent to look at a neighborhood-centric scenario with either a utility or maybe other things,” Walsh said. “That would be a good scenario for us to work on, and we’ll get that scheduled.”
What we know from the federal investigation
Before council discussion began, city officials provided an overview of information already released by the NTSB, which has been investigating the explosions since April 22.
The preliminary report outlined a timeline that has become central to unanswered questions about the response.
According to the NTSB, the first natural gas-fueled explosion occurred at about 6:04 p.m. at 15066 Preston Hollow Drive, seriously injuring three residents inside the home. The San Antonio Fire Department arrived about five minutes later and extinguished the fire.
CPS Energy personnel reached the scene at about 6:32 p.m.
About 18 minutes later, a CPS employee conducting bar hole testing located a leak in the service line to 15062 Preston Hollow Drive, a home between the two residences that exploded.
The second explosion of an occupied single-family home occurred about 8:25 p.m., nearly 90 minutes after the leak was located, according to the preliminary report. CPS isolated the leak and later disconnected and plugged the service line at about 1:40 a.m. April 22.
The report also noted that the second home that exploded did not have active natural gas service. The neighborhood gas system had service lines that were installed in 1993. At the time of both explosions, the system was operating well below the maximum allowable operating pressure.
NTSB investigators later confirmed gas in the ground near both damaged homes and the residence between them. The leaking section of the service line and part of the gas main were removed and sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further evaluation.
Officials stressed the preliminary report does not determine what caused the leak or either explosion. All aspects of the incident remain under investigation, with a final report expected to take 12 to 24 months to complete.
